Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

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Abstract

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm’s ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.

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1. Introduction

Growing environmental consciousness among consumers and increasing stringency of environmental policies by public authorities over the past decades have encouraged private firms to invest in the adoption and development of environmentally cleaner technology. One can view environmental consciousness of consumers (i.e., their willingness to pay more for goods produced with lower environmental damage)\(^1\) as an important social mechanism that disciplines the negative environmental externalities created by rent seeking firms, and as being complementary to environmental regulation by public authorities. Consumers, however, often lack information about the actual production processes of individual firms. Some information may be conveyed through ecolabeling\(^2\) and other certification by intermediaries, as well as by firms being (or not being) in compliance with government regulations. It is, however, fair to say that such information often pertains to only certain specific kinds of environmental damage, and remains significantly limited relative to the scope of environmental concerns of consumers. Note that even if regulatory authorities succeed in gathering better information about the actual environmental performance of firms and make it publicly accessible,\(^3\) such...
Thus, lower price may signal better "quality." Higher level of regulation, the clean type has lower effective marginal cost of production compared to the dirty type, and marginal cost of production depends on the level of exogenously given environmental regulation, and for significantly higher level of regulation, the clean type has lower effective marginal cost of production compared to the dirty type. This part of the analysis is closely related to quality-signaling games considered in the industrial organization literature (see, for instance, [3]). However, unlike much of the quality-signaling literature, in my framework, the effective marginal cost of production differs between the clean and dirty technology facilitates this signaling. Even while the clean firm manages to credibly convey its private information about production technology by choosing its price appropriately, it often distorts the extent of market power, consumer surplus and profit relative to the full information outcome.

In a monopoly market that is not subject to any environmental regulation, Mahenc [14,15] shows that better environmental quality is signaled by higher price, if the marginal production cost is relatively higher for the clean type. In this paper, I show that this continues to hold when the industry is subject to environmental regulation, but regulation is "weak". However, under significantly higher level of regulation, the firm may use a lower price to signal its clean technology. This part of the analysis is closely related to quality-signaling games considered in the industrial organization literature (see, for instance, [3]). However, unlike much of the quality-signaling literature, in my framework, the effective marginal cost of production depends on the level of exogenously given environmental regulation, and for significantly higher level of regulation, the clean type has lower effective marginal cost of production compared to the dirty type, and thus, lower price may signal better "quality." More precisely, I find that there is no price or profit distortion due to signaling when the level of environmental regulation is either very low or very high. However, in an intermediate range of regulation there is signaling distortion. Further, within this range, there is a critical level of regulation such that the clean type charges higher price compared to its full information monopoly price if the level of regulation is below the critical level. Below this critical level, increase in regulation increases the extent of price distortion due to signaling which, loosely speaking, increases the loss of both consumer and producer surplus. However, as regulation increases beyond the critical level, there is a downward jump in the clean firm’s signaling price to a level below its full information monopoly price which reduces market power and increases consumer welfare. Price distortion and profit distortion decline as regulation is increased beyond the critical level. My analysis sheds light on a possible beneficial effect of increasing regulation that can act through reduction in distortion and market power under incomplete information. Note that this effect is entirely independent of any beneficial effect that regulation has through changes in the environmental externalities caused by the firm.

The profit distortion of the firm due to signaling creates an incentive for the firm to move, if possible, to a world of full information through direct and credible disclosure to consumers. The effect of increase in regulation on the extent of profit

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4 Following are few examples of mandatory environmental reporting imposed by public authorities on firms: Toxic Release Inventory (USA), Environmental Reporting Decree (the Netherlands), Green Accounts (Denmark), and Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (UK).

5 Even if public regulation takes the form of emission permit or tax, information about the actual trades or tax payments by the firm may not be available to consumers.

6 Hwang et al. [12] find that consumers use price as a signal of the quality of genetically modified food (corn, bread, and egg).

7 Antelo and Loureiro [1] discuss the incomplete information problem where firms signal environmental performance to the regulator, and then the regulator decides on the optimal policy.

8 The closest result to this, in the existing literature, is provided in a somewhat different context by Daughety and Reinganum [8]. They show that lower price signals a safer product when marginal cost of risk per unit output sold is significantly high.
distortion due to signaling therefore establishes an interesting relationship between environmental regulation and the incentive for direct disclosure of environmental performance through an eco-label (or other third-party certification), as well as its incentive to lobby for imposition of mandatory disclosure regulation. When regulation is below a critical level, the firm has greater incentive for direct disclosure when regulation becomes more stringent; but once the level of regulation goes beyond a critical level, further increase in regulation will only reduce this incentive (and the firm is more likely to prefer to signal its private information).

Next, I examine whether a firm initially endowed with dirty technology has any incentive to invest in the development of a cleaner production technology where the outcome of investment is intrinsically uncertain; the latter may reflect uncertainty about the success of the project or the environmental impact of the new technology. Investment is observed publicly but not the realized technology (or the environmental attribute of the technology i.e., whether it is clean or dirty). In the next stage, the firm with private information about its realized technology sets its price.

To the best of my knowledge, the existing literature contains no analysis of the relationship between environmental regulation, signaling of environmental attribute of technology to green consumers through price, and their relation to the incentive of a firm to invest in cleaner technology. I show that even though green consumers are willing to pay more for the product of a clean firm and even when the cost of investment is arbitrarily small, a monopolist has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology if regulation is not strong enough. However, if regulation exceeds a critical level, higher regulation increases the effectiveness of consumer consciousness and creates incentive to invest in the development of potentially cleaner technology. This provides theoretical support for the principal claim of the celebrated Porter Hypothesis i.e., “stringent regulation can actually produce greater innovation” [19,20]. Further, I discuss how the incentive of a firm to invest in cleaner technology changes with the level of environmental regulation.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the signaling game and how environmental regulation affects the nature of separating equilibrium under monopoly. In Section 3, I discuss a case where a monopolist may invest in cleaner technology in the first stage and analyze the effect of an increase in the level of environmental regulation on the incentive to invest. Section 4 concludes.

2. Signaling environmental quality through price

2.1. Basic model

Consider a monopoly where the production process of the monopolist firm may cause environmental damage. I assume that depending on its current production technology, the firm could be of two types: clean (C) or dirty (D); a firm has zero emissions if it is clean, and a firm emits β > 0 per unit of output if it is dirty. In the basic model discussed in this section, the type of the firm i.e., whether its production technology is clean or dirty, is given, and it is known to the firm but not to the consumers. The firm produces output at constant unit cost that depends on its type. The unit production cost of the clean type is denoted by m_c and that of the dirty type by m_d where

\[ 0 < m_D < m_C \]

Emission in the industry is regulated with the firm being required to purchase emission permits from a competitive emission permit market at an exogenously given price \( t \). Here emission is a proxy for any kind of environmental damage, and the emission permit price \( t \) represents any expected cost that a firm may have to incur for the environmental damage caused by the production process. For example, under liability rule, if a firm’s production process causes significant environmental damage over time then in the long run, it might be required to pay a penalty or damage compensation by a court of law and the emission price would then capture the future expected liability payments. The effective marginal cost of supplying the product when the firm is of the dirty type is given by

\[ X_D = m_D + t \beta \]

As the clean firm does not emit, its effective marginal cost of supplying the product is simply its marginal production cost \( m_c \).

There is a unit mass of risk neutral consumers in the market. A consumer has a quasi linear utility function for the clean type’s product given by

\[ u_c = m - \frac{1}{2\lambda^2}(a - q)^2 \]

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9 In the standard product quality literature, Shieh [23] analyzes whether a monopolist has an incentive to invest in cost reducing technology when consumers are not aware of the firm’s investment decision and the quality of the product.

10 This is a simplifying assumption; a positive rate of emission for the clean type (that is less than the per unit emission of the dirty type) would not alter the main qualitative results.

11 I do not ask the normative question of optimal regulation, and it is beyond the scope of this framework to check whether the existing level of regulation is socially optimal as there is no emission damage function explicitly modeled.
and that for the dirty type’s product is given by

\[ u^D = m - \frac{1}{2}(a-q)^2 \]

respectively, where \( m > 0, a > m_C \), where \( a \) is a consumer-specific environmental consciousness index and \( x \) is distributed uniformly on the interval \([z, 1]\) where \( 0 < z < 1 \). Note that a lower value of \( z \) implies a more environmentally conscious distribution of preferences (in a first-order stochastic sense). Observe that for all \( a < 1 \) the marginal utility of consuming clean type’s product is greater than that of the dirty type

\[ \frac{1}{z}(a-q) > (a-q) \]

which implies that all consumers are willing to pay more for the cleaner product; this is consistent with the standard way of modeling environmental consciousness in the existing literature (discussed in the previous section). In particular, the individual demand for the product produced by the clean type and the dirty type are

\[ q^C = a - \frac{1}{2}(a-q)p \]

and

\[ q^D = a - p \]

respectively. The aggregate demand for the dirty type’s product is

\[ D^D(p) = a - p \quad (1) \]

The aggregate demand for the clean type’s product is

\[ D^C(p) = \frac{1}{1 - 2z} \int_{z}^{1} (a - x)p \, dx = a - \frac{p}{\rho} \quad (2) \]

where

\[ \rho = \frac{2}{(1 + 2z)} > 1 \]

A higher value of \( \rho \) corresponds to a lower value of \( z \) i.e., a more conscious distribution of preferences.

I assume the following

\[ t < \frac{a - m_D}{\beta} \quad \text{(Assumption 1)} \]

This ensures that the effective marginal cost of a firm is always less than the choke price.

Consumers are not aware of the actual environmental performance of a firm (or the trades in the emission permit market). Ex ante, consumers believe that the firm is of clean (C) type with probability \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) and of dirty (D) type with probability \( (1 - \mu) \). Consumers are, however, aware of the cost parameters (i.e., \( m_C, m_D \), and \( t \)) and the demand structure.

The full information equilibrium monopoly price for a firm of clean type (which produces at a unit cost of \( m_C \)) is given by

\[ p_{C}^{fl} = \frac{a \rho + m_C}{2} \]

while that of the dirty type (with effective marginal cost \( X_D \)) is

\[ p_{D}^{fl} = \frac{a + X_D}{2} \]

In the basic model, I consider a two stage Bayesian game. In the first stage, nature draws the type (clean or dirty) of the firm from a distribution that assigns probability \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) to clean type and probability \( (1 - \mu) \) to dirty type. This move of nature is observed only by the firm. After observing its realized type, the firm chooses its price. Finally, consumers observe the price charged by the firm, update their beliefs, and decide whether to buy. The solution concept used is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) where out of equilibrium beliefs satisfy the Cho-Kreps [6] Intuitive Criterion.

Let \( t^c \) be the critical emission price at which the effective marginal cost of a clean type (\( m_C \)) is exactly equal to that of the dirty type (\( X_D \)) i.e.

\[ t^c = \frac{m_C - m_D}{\beta} \]

At any emission price \( t < t^c \), the effective marginal cost of a clean type is strictly higher than that of a dirty type whereas the relative cost structure gets reversed at any emission price \( t > t^c \). In the rest of the paper, I will refer any emission price \( t < t^c \) as low emission price and the associated regime as being one of weak regulation; \( t > t^c \) will be termed high emission price and the associated regime as being one of strong regulation.
2.2. Signaling environmental performance under weak regulation

For any emission price \( t \leq t^e \), the effective marginal cost of a clean type is higher than that of a dirty type \((m_c \geq X_D)\), and I find that in the unique separating equilibrium\(^{12}\) high price signals environment friendly production process.

**Proposition 1.** Suppose that \( t \leq t^e \) i.e., the emission price is low (weak regulation) so that the effective marginal cost is lower for the dirty type. Then, the unique separating equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion is one where higher price signals better environmental performance (clean type). Further, in this equilibrium, the dirty type always charges its full information monopoly price whereas the clean type may charge a price equal to or higher than its own full information monopoly price.

In a separating equilibrium, where the type of the firm is always revealed, if the firm is of a dirty type it will always charge its full information monopoly price. Note that for any emission price \( t \leq t^e \), the full information monopoly price of a dirty type is lower than that of the clean type; the difference in prices depends on the difference between the effective marginal costs of the clean type and the dirty type which in turn varies with the level of emission price. If dirty type imitates the higher price charged by the clean type, it will fool consumers into believing that the product is actually being sold by a clean type and therefore, will face a higher market demand. However, as the full information monopoly price of the clean type is higher, despite the fact that the demand curve for the clean product is higher, the actual quantity sold at that price may be lower than what the dirty type sells at its full information monopoly price (with consumer knowing that it is a dirty firm). This trade-off between imitating a higher price and selling lower quantity determines the incentive of the dirty type to imitate. The higher the clean firm’s price is relative to the dirty type’s full information monopoly price the less is the quantity sold by imitating the clean type’s high price. More importantly, as the dirty type has a lower marginal cost of production, it is more interested (than the cleaner type) in selling high quantity at lower price rather than lower quantity at higher price. Further, the lower the difference in marginal cost between the two types, the smaller the relative incentive of the dirty type to charge higher price.

Under significantly lower emission price, the large difference in the effective marginal costs implies significant difference in the full information monopoly prices of the clean and the dirty type. If the dirty type imitates the clean type’s action i.e., charges full information monopoly price of the clean type then the dirty type (with relatively lower effective marginal cost) sells lower quantity and earns lower profit compared to what it would have earned if it charges its own full information monopoly price. In that case, the dirty type does not have any incentive to imitate the clean type. Therefore, in the separating equilibrium a firm of clean type charges its own full information monopoly price when the emission price is below a critical level.

An increase in the level of emission price reduces the gap between the effective marginal costs of both types which implies that the difference between full information monopoly prices of the clean type and the dirty type becomes smaller; this, in turn, increases the incentive of the dirty type to imitate the clean type. In other words, if the dirty type imitates the clean type’s higher price-lower quantity combination then it earns higher profit compared to the profit it earns when it charges its own full information monopoly price. Therefore, in order to convince the consumers and deter the dirty type from imitating its higher price-lower quantity combination, the clean type charges a higher price than its own full information monopoly price; this deviation by the clean type from its own full information monopoly price is referred as upward signaling distortion.

The equilibrium outcome described above is supported by the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs of consumers: if the price charged by a firm is above the equilibrium price of the clean type then consumers believe that it is a clean firm with probability one, otherwise consumers believe that it is a dirty firm with probability one. It is easy to verify that given these out-of-equilibrium beliefs of consumers, a firm whether it is clean or dirty has no incentive to charge any out-of-equilibrium price. Following the argument in Bagwell and Riordan’s [3] paper, it can be shown that these out-of-equilibrium beliefs satisfy Intuitive Criterion which selects equilibrium with minimum signaling distortion.

As mentioned in Section 1, in the absence of any environmental regulation, Mahenc [14,15] shows that higher price always signals better environmental quality of a monopolist. In my framework, a monopolist behaves in the same manner as long as the emission price is below the critical level i.e., \( t \leq t^e \).

2.3. Signaling environmental performance under strong regulation

Recall that at any emission price \( t \geq t^e = (m_c-m_D)/\beta \) which is referred as high emission price, the effective marginal cost of a clean type is relatively lower than that of the dirty firm \((m_c \leq X_D)\); this contradicts the standard assumption (i.e., a clean type has higher marginal cost). In this case, the difference between the effective marginal cost of the clean type and the dirty type increases and thus, the incentive of the dirty type to imitate the clean type decreases with increase in the emission price.

\(^{12}\) In the separating equilibrium, a clean type must charge a price such that after observing the price consumers believe that it is a clean type with probability one; in other words, consumers should be convinced that a dirty type will not charge such a price as it is not profitable for the dirty type to do so.
Proposition 2. Suppose that \( t \geq t^8 \) i.e., the emission price is high (stringent regulation) so that the effective marginal cost is lower for the clean firm. Then, in the unique separating equilibrium, lower price signals better environmental performance (clean type). The dirty type always charges its full information monopoly price whereas the clean type charges a price which is equal to or lower than its own full information monopoly price. Incomplete information may reduce the market power of a firm.

First, note that Proposition 2 suggests that higher price does not always signal better environmental performance.\(^\text{13}\) In the separating equilibrium, if a firm is of dirty type it cannot do better than charging its own full information monopoly price at any emission price \( t \geq t^8 \). Consider an emission price which is moderately high i.e., though the effective marginal cost of the clean type is lower than that of the dirty type, the gap between the full information monopoly price of the dirty type and the clean type is small enough to create an incentive for the dirty type to imitate the clean type’s action. In this case, since the effective marginal cost of a dirty type is more than that of a clean type \((X_D > m_C)\), a clean firm cannot reveal its type by charging a higher price relative to the price charged by the dirty type. Rather, in the separating equilibrium, a clean type prefers to sell a higher quantity and charges a price lower than its own full information monopoly price; this deviation by the clean type is known as downward signaling distortion. On the other hand, increase in the emission price beyond a critical level increases the gap between the effective marginal costs of both types which in turn reduces the incentive of the dirty to type to imitate clean type’s price. In this case, if the firm is of clean type it charges its full information monopoly price which is lower than that of the full information monopoly price of the dirty type (as the effective marginal cost is higher for the clean type compared to the dirty type).

The equilibrium outcome is supported by the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs of consumers: if the price charged by a firm is greater than equal to the price charged by the dirty type then consumers believe that it is a dirty firm with probability one, otherwise consumers believe that the firm is a clean type with probability one. Given this out-of-equilibrium beliefs of consumers, a firm whether it is clean or dirty has no incentive to charge any out-of-equilibrium price. As before, following the argument in Bagwell and Riordan’s [3] paper, it can be easily verified that these out-of-equilibrium-beliefs satisfy Intuitive Criterion which selects the equilibrium with the minimum signaling distortion.

2.4. Signaling distortions and welfare effects

From the above discussion one can conclude that a monopolist signals its environmental performance to consumers through price, and the choice of signaling equilibrium price depends on the level of emission price. The fact that consumers are uninformed about the actual environmental performance of the firm though they are willing to pay more for the product produced by a clean technology creates an incentive for the clean firm to act differently from the way it would have behaved under full information. In particular, if a firm is of clean type it chooses a price in the fully revealing equilibrium such that if the firm were of a dirty type it would not have charged the same price; thus, the firm can convince the consumers of its actual environmental performance by choosing the optimal price. However, for a certain range of emission price the incentive of the dirty type to imitate the clean type’s action is quite high and the clean type charges a price which is not equal to its own full information monopoly price. This deviation from the full information monopoly price by the firm when it is of the clean type is known as signaling distortion. The extent and nature of signaling distortion depends, among other things, on the difference in effective marginal cost of production and the latter, in turn, depends on the extent of regulation.

Recall that for any emission price \( t \leq t^8 \) the effective marginal cost of the clean type is higher than that of the dirty type and is lower otherwise. The following proposition and Fig. 1 summarize the effect of increase in the level of emission price on the signaling behavior of a monopolist.

Proposition 3. (i) There exists a critical level of emission price \( t^U \) such that at any emission price \( t \in [t^U, t^8] \), the clean type charges a higher price compared to its own full information monopoly price to signal its environmental performance (i.e., there is upward signaling distortion).

(ii) There exists a critical emission price \( t^D \) such that at any \( t \in [t^8, t^U] \), a clean firm charges a price which is lower than its own full information monopoly price to signal its environmental performance (i.e., there is downward signaling distortion).

(iii) If the emission price is significantly low (i.e., \( t \leq t^U \)) or high (i.e., \( t \geq t^D \)), then there is no signaling distortion, and the market outcome is as under full information.

Proof. See Appendix.

Let \( \Delta_p \) be the measure of price distortion due to signaling i.e., the difference between signaling distortion price and full information monopoly price; when \( \Delta_p > 0 \) then there is upward signaling distortion, and \( \Delta_p < 0 \) implies that there is downward signaling distortion. For any \( t \leq t^8 \), \( \Delta_p > 0 \), and the value of \( \Delta_p \) increases with increase in the level of emission price; whereas, for any \( t \in [t^8, t^D] \), \( \Delta_p < 0 \), and the absolute value of \( \Delta_p \) decreases with increase in the level of emission price.

\(^{13}\) Mahenc [15] mentions that if it is cheap to produce cleaner products then the clean type would indeed reveal its environmental performance by charging a price lower than that prevailing under full information.
Proposition 4. When the emission price is low \((t_U \leq t \leq t_R)\ i.e., \text{weak regulation}\), the extent of upward signaling distortion \((\text{the absolute value of } \Delta_p)\) in the separating equilibrium increases with an increase in emission price \((\text{i.e., increase in regulation})\). On the other hand, when the emission price is high \((t_R \leq t \leq t_D)\ i.e., \text{strong regulation}\), the extent of downward signaling distortion \((\text{the absolute value of } \Delta_p)\) in the separating equilibrium decreases with an increase in emission price \((\text{i.e., increase in regulation})\).

Proof. See Appendix.

In Fig. 2, the upward sloping curve of broken-line denotes the full information monopoly price of the clean type whereas the curve with solid-line depicts the equilibrium price charged by the clean type in the signaling equilibrium. The two curves converge for any emission price \(t_R \leq t \leq t_U\) and \(t \geq t_D\) which implies that there is no signaling distortion. However, at any emission price \(t_U \leq t \leq t_R\) the curve of broken line is below the solid line which represents upward signaling distortion whereas downward signaling distortion by the clean type is depicted over a higher range of emission price viz., \(t_R \leq t \leq t_D\). It is evident from Fig. 2 that the extent of upward price distortion due to signaling i.e., the distance between two curves increases as emission price increases whereas the measure of downward price distortion due to signaling decreases as the two curve comes closer to each other with increase in regulation. Observe that exactly at emission price \(t = t_R\) there is a discontinuity or downward jump in the signaling equilibrium price of the clean type. This implies that in the signaling equilibrium the clean type charges a price either less than or more than its full information monopoly price.

Let \(\Delta_z\) be the measure of profit distortion due to signaling i.e., the difference between signaling distortion profit and the full information profit of the clean type. Note that full information profit of the clean type is always at least as large as the profit earned by the clean type firm in the separating equilibrium i.e., \(\Delta_z \leq 0\); further, for any \(t \in [t_U, t_R]\) the absolute value of \(\Delta_z\) increases with increase in the level of emission price; whereas, for any \(t \in [t_R, t_D]\), and the absolute value of \(\Delta_z\) decreases with regulation.

Proposition 5. When the emission price is low \((t_U \leq t \leq t_R)\ i.e., \text{weak regulation}\), the extent of upward signaling distortion of profit \((\text{the absolute value of } \Delta_z)\) in the separating equilibrium increases with an increase in emission price \((\text{i.e., increase in regulation})\). On the other hand, when the emission price is high \((t_R \leq t \leq t_D)\ i.e., \text{strong regulation}\), the extent of downward signaling distortion of profit \((\text{the absolute value of } \Delta_z)\) in the separating equilibrium decreases with an increase in emission price \((\text{i.e., increase in regulation})\).

Proof. See Appendix.

Observe that loss in profit due to signaling through price creates an incentive for the clean type to directly and credibly disclose its environmental performance through an eco-label or other third-party certification. The extent of profit
distortion due to signaling can be interpreted as the maximum amount that a clean type firm is willing to spend to acquire such an eco-label. Proposition 5 illustrates that under weak regulation the incentive to acquire an eco-label increases with regulation, on the other hand, when the level of regulation is significantly strong it decreases with an increase in the emission price. The presence of profit distortion due to signaling also increases the incentive of a clean type to lobby for mandatory disclosure of the environmental performance of a firm. It is evident from Proposition 5 that when the emission price is low i.e., \( t^u \leq t \leq t^d \) the clean type's incentive to lobby for compulsory disclosure increases whereas it decreases with increase in emission price when the regulation is stringent i.e., \( t^d \leq t \leq t^0 \).

This paper is silent about the normative question of optimal environmental regulation since environmental damage is not explicitly modeled. However, it is possible to study how change in the level of exogenously given level of regulation affects market power of the clean type and consumer surplus.

Table 1 summarizes the effect of increase in the emission price on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and market power of the clean type. Consumer surplus decreases as signaling equilibrium price increases with increase in the level of regulation (except in the neighborhood of the emission price \( t = t^d \)). Market power and producer surplus increase with regulation only when the clean type charges a price above its full information price and decrease otherwise. Observe that if the level of environmental regulation shifts from an emission price \( t = t^d + \epsilon \) to \( t = t^d - \epsilon \) where \( \epsilon > 0 \) and infinitesimally small, then the signaling equilibrium price of a clean type falls, market power and producer surplus decrease, and consumer surplus increases. In Fig. 2, if the emission price increases from \( t_0 \) to \( t_1 \) then signaling equilibrium price of the clean type falls down from \( p_{0}\) to \( p_{1} \); as a result, the consumer surplus increases, and market power as well as producer surplus decrease. This is perhaps the most striking result as it contradicts the standard belief that more stringent regulation worsens consumer welfare and helps rent seeking firm to gain more market power. In particular, an increase in the emission price affects the signaling behavior of a monopolist where the consumers are not aware of the actual environmental performance of the firm and this, in turn, may increase the well being of consumers.

### 3. Incentive to invest in cleaner technology

In this section, I study an extension of the basic model where the firm may invest in development and adoption of cleaner technology. The outcome of this investment is uncertain and determines the realized technology type of the firm. Further, as in the basic model, the realized technology is unobserved by consumers and the firm faces a market with incomplete information about its true type.

In particular, suppose that the firm is initially endowed (for sure) with a dirty production technology i.e., it produces \( \beta \) units of emission per unit of output and incurs a post-regulation marginal cost of \( X_D = m_D + tD \), where \( m_D \) is the unit cost of production, and \( t \) is the exogenously given emission price. Before going into production, the firm decides whether or not to undertake a project to develop cleaner technology. If it decides to undertake the project, it has to incur (an exogenously fixed amount) \( f > 0 \) as cost of investment. If undertaken, the project is successful with probability \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) in which case it leads to development and adoption of a clean production technology; however, the project is unsuccessful and the technology remains dirty with probability \( (1-\mu) \). If a firm does not invest then it incurs zero investment cost and remains dirty for sure. If investment leads to clean technology, the firm emits zero per unit of output incurring a unit cost of \( m_C \). I assume that if the realized outcome is a clean production technology then the firm always uses that technology. As described in Section 2, there is a unit mass of risk neutral consumers; the aggregate demand for the product of the clean and the dirty types are given by (2) and (1) respectively.

Formally, I have a multi-stage Bayesian game. In the first stage, a firm decides whether to invest in development of cleaner production technology; consumers observe firm's investment decision, but they do not know the realized outcome (in case the firm invests). Then, nature draws the type of an investing firm from a distribution that assigns probability \( \mu \in (0, 1) \) to the clean type and probability \( (1-\mu) \) to the dirty type. This move of nature is only observed by the firm. Next, the firm chooses its price, and finally, consumers decide whether to buy.

If the effective marginal cost of the dirty type is lower than the clean type i.e., \( X_D < m_C \) then in the signaling equilibrium the dirty type (which charges its own full information monopoly price) earns higher profit than the profit earned by the

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14 In the next section, the measure of profit distortion plays an important role to analyze how a firm's incentive to invest changes with emission price.

15 Observe that after firms invest to develop a cleaner technology, if firms are again allowed to choose the production technology to be used, then if dirty technology is cheaper, a firm may discard the realized clean technology as the dirty firm may earn higher profit. In this case, consumers will infer that any firm that invests is a dirty firm with probability one, and therefore, in equilibrium no firm invests.
dirty type if it imitates the higher price and lower quantity of the clean type; otherwise, the dirty type will always imitate
the clean type. The market profit of the dirty type if it imitates the clean type is always larger relative to that of the clean
type as the effective marginal cost of the dirty is lower than the clean type. Therefore, in this case, a firm has no incentive
to invest in development of clean technology since the dirty type always earns higher profit than the clean type; this
continues to hold even if the cost of investment is zero. However, if the cost structure is reversed, i.e., \( X_D > m_C \), then
the clean type earns higher profit in the separating equilibrium. Therefore, under strong regulation when the effective
marginal cost of the clean type is higher than the dirty type, a firm endowed with dirty technology has an incentive
to invest in clean technology. Observe that for any \( t > t^R \) (which implies \( X_D > m_C \)) as emission price increases, the difference
between profits earned by a clean type and a dirty type decreases.

**Proposition 6.** (i) If the emission price \( t \leq t^R = (m_C-m_D)/\beta \) i.e., regulation is weak, a firm does not invest in cleaner technology
(no matter how small the cost of investment \( f \)).
(ii) At any emission price \( t > t^R = (m_C-m_D)/\beta \) i.e., if regulation is strong, and in addition, the cost of investment \( f \) is not too
large, then the firm invests in development of clean production technology.

**Proof.** See Appendix.

The fact that at significantly higher level of regulation (\( t > t^R \)) the monopolist does have an incentive to invest in cleaner
technology confirms the fundamental claim of famous Porter Hypothesis that “stringent regulation” induces “innovation”.
Recall that the main objective of the paper is to critically examine the effectiveness of environmental regulation to motivate
a monopolist to adopt cleaner technology where the market consists of environmentally conscious consumers
who are willing to pay more for the product produced by the cleaner firm though they are not aware of the actual
technology used by the firm. From the above-mentioned proposition it is clear that in order to promote green
technological change in such a market structure the level of regulation should be set above a critical level \( t = t^R \). In the
rest of this section, I intend to analyze how a firm’s incentive to invest in cleaner technology changes with (exogenous)
increase in emission price beyond this critical level.

The incentive to invest in cleaner technology is measured by the difference in the expected profit earned by the firm if it
invests in cleaner technology and the profit earned by the firm if it does not invest and thus remains dirty. Let \( \Delta_I \) denote
the measure of the incentive to invest in cleaner technology under incomplete information. For any emission price \( t \in \{t^R, t^D\} \)
\[
\Delta_I = \mu \pi_D + (1-\mu)\pi^F_D - \pi^F_D
= \mu (\pi_D - \pi^F_D)
\]
where \( \pi_D \) is the profit earned by the clean type and \( \pi^F_D \) is the (full information) profit earned by the dirty type in the
separating equilibrium. Further, \( \Delta_I \) can be decomposed as follows:
\[
\Delta_I = \mu (\pi_D - \pi^F_D) + \mu (\pi^F_D - \pi^F_D)
= \mu (\Delta \pi_D + \Delta^F_D)
\]
where \( \pi^F_D \) is the profit earned by the clean type under full information, \( \Delta \pi_D = \pi^F_D - \pi^F_D \) is the profit distortion due to signaling
discussed at the end of Section 2, and \( \Delta^F_D = \pi^F_D - \pi^F_D \) is the measure of incentive to invest in cleaner technology under full
information; profit distortion due to signaling is negative at any emission price i.e., \( \Delta \pi_D < 0 \), but when the regulation is
strong (\( t \in \{t^R, t^D\} \)) the incentive to invest in cleaner technology under full information is positive i.e., \( \Delta^F_D > 0 \). The following
expression represents the effect of regulation on the incentive to invest in cleaner technology:
\[
\frac{\partial \Delta_I}{\partial t} = \mu \left( \frac{\partial (\Delta \pi_D)}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial \Delta^F_D}{\partial t} \right)
\]

**Proposition 5** illustrates that for any emission price \( t \in \{t^R, t^D\} \) the absolute value of profit distortion due to signaling
decreases with an increase in emission price i.e., \( (\partial (\Delta \pi_D)/\partial t < 0 \). The effect of the increase in the level of regulation on the
measure of incentive to invest in cleaner technology under full information is given by
\[
\frac{\partial \Delta^F_D}{\partial t} = \beta q^F_D > 0
\]
Therefore, for any emission price \( t \in \{t^R, t^D\} \), the effect of increase in emission price on the incentive to invest in cleaner
technology under incomplete information remains ambiguous as it depends on the net effect of increase in emission price
on profit distortion due to signaling and on the incentive to invest under full information. Note that, for any emission price
\( t > t^D \), change in the incentive of a firm to invest in cleaner technology with increase in regulation is identical to that of the
full information case as the clean type charges its own full information monopoly price.
4. Conclusion

I consider a market where consumers are willing to pay more for the product produced by the cleaner technology but differ in terms of their environmental consciousness (marginal willingness to pay for cleaner product). It is generally recognized that increase in such consciousness among consumers ought to provide firms with a market-based incentive to adopt cleaner technology. However, environmental groups often argue that the effectiveness of environmental consciousness in promoting green technological change is limited because of incomplete information and in particular, as consumers are often unaware of the actual environmental performance of the firms. While mechanisms such as eco-labeling or third-party certification can mitigate some of these information problems, they are not available in every market and the information revealed is at best partial. This paper is an attempt to critically analyze the effect of environmental regulation on a firm’s ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology in markets with uninformed but conscious consumers.

When regulation is weak (low levels of taxes or emission permit price or liability), the clean type often charges higher price than its own optimal full information price in order to credibly signal the true environmental impact of its production process; increase in regulation (such as tax or emission permit price) over this range increases the price distortion needed for signaling which, loosely speaking, increases market power and producer surplus whereas decreases consumer surplus. More importantly, I find that for such levels of regulation, the monopolist has no incentive to invest in the development of a cleaner production technology even if investment is costless. Increase in regulation over this range has no impact on technology. This is closely related to the fact that consumers remain uninformed about realized improvement in production technology and the clean firm still has to incur considerable cost to signal its type credibly.

However, as regulation increases beyond a critical level, the cost advantage of the dirty production process disappears, and two dramatic qualitative changes occur. First, there is a sudden downward jump in the clean firm’s signaling price to a level below its full information monopoly price which in turn reduces market power and increases consumer welfare. This striking consequence of increasing stringency of environmental regulation is entirely independent of any beneficial effect that regulation has through actual environmental impact. Second, the firm now has a positive incentive to invest in development of cleaner technology.

The public policy implication is that in order to allow environmental consciousness of consumers to effectively promote green technological change in an incomplete information setting, public authorities may need to impose significantly high levels of regulation. Regulation and consciousness become complementary mechanisms for creating technological change and improving welfare. Further, the relative inefficacy of lower levels of regulation should not be used as an indication of its performance at higher levels. Beyond a critical level, a small increase in regulation can lead to major improvements in market welfare of consumers, as well as the incentive of the firm to invest in research and development of green technology.

Finally, the profit distortion due to signaling also determines the incentive of the firm to move, if possible, to a world of full information through direct and credible disclosure to consumers. The effect of increase in regulation on the extent of profit distortion therefore establishes an interesting relationship between environmental regulation and the incentive for direct disclosure of environmental performance through an eco-label (or other third-party certification) as well as its incentive to lobby for imposition of mandatory disclosure regulation. When regulation is weak, increasing the level of regulation increases the incentive of the firm for direct disclosure; but once the level of regulation goes beyond a critical level, further increase in regulation may only reduce this incentive.

Appendix A

Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. Propositions 1 and 2 follow from the following characterization of the equilibrium. □

Lemma 1. For any \( t \leq \tau^C \), the unique separating equilibrium prices are

\[
P^D_0 = P^D_1 \quad \text{and} \quad P^C_0 = \max\{P^C_0, P^D_1\}
\]

where \( P^D_0 \) and \( P^C_0 \) are the equilibrium price charged by the dirty type and the clean type respectively, and

\[
P^C_1 = \frac{a \rho + X_D}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(a^2 \rho - X_D^2)}
\]

For any \( t > \tau^C \) there exists a separating equilibrium

\[
P^D_0 = P^D_1 \quad \text{and} \quad P^C_0 = \min\{P^C_0, P^D_1\}
\]

where

\[
P^D_1 = \frac{a \rho + X_D}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(a^2 \rho - X_D^2)}
\]

Proof. A clean type has no incentive to mimic the dirty type if it charges a price \( P^C \) in the equilibrium such that \( \pi(C,1,P^C) > \pi(C,0,P^D_1) \) i.e., the clean type does not earn higher profit when it imitates a dirty type, and this is possible.

\[\text{Proof.}\] A clean type has no incentive to mimic the dirty type if it charges a price \( P^C \) in the equilibrium such that \( \pi(C,1,P^C) > \pi(C,0,P^D_1) \) i.e., the clean type does not earn higher profit when it imitates a dirty type, and this is possible.

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\[\text{Proof.}\] A clean type has no incentive to mimic the dirty type if it charges a price \( P^C \) in the equilibrium such that \( \pi(C,1,P^C) > \pi(C,0,P^D_1) \) i.e., the clean type does not earn higher profit when it imitates a dirty type, and this is possible.
when clean type charges a price $P_C$ such that $P_C \leq P_C \leq \overline{P}$ (incentive compatibility constraint of a clean type) where

$$P_C = P_C - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(a\rho - m_C)^2 - \rho(a + X_D - 2m_C)(a - X_D)}$$

and

$$\overline{P} = P_C + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(a\rho - m_C)^2 - \rho(a + X_D - 2m_C)(a - X_D)}$$

Observe that the incentive compatibility constraint for clean type is always satisfied at $P_C = P_C$ when $X_D < m_C$. Similarly, a dirty type has no incentive to imitate the clean type i.e., $\pi(D,0,P_D^opt) > \pi(D,1,P_C)$ if the clean type charges a price $P_C$ such that either

$$P_C \geq P^D = \frac{a\rho + X_D}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$

or

$$P_C \leq P^D = \frac{a\rho + X_D}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$

(incentive compatibility constraint of a dirty type). Note that

$$(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2) > 0 \quad \text{since} \quad \rho > 1.$$}

For any emission price $t < t_8(\Rightarrow X_D < m_C)$, $P^D < \overline{P}$ and $P^D < P^\rho$; this implies that if a clean type charges a price $P_C$ such that $P_C < P_C < P^D$ then a dirty type has an incentive to imitate the clean type. On the other hand, if a clean type charges a price below $P^\rho$ then incentive compatibility constraint of a clean type implies that the clean type finds it profitable to imitate the dirty type as $P^D < P^\rho$. Therefore, a clean firm cannot reveal its type by charging a lower price than $P^D$. In particular, if $P_C^opt \geq P^D$ then in the separating equilibrium a clean type charges $P_C^D$; whereas, if $P_C^opt < P^D$ i.e.

$$m_C - X_D < \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$

then it charges $P^D$ (which is also the minimum upward signaling distortion price) in order to deter the dirty type from imitating its higher price-lower quantity combination. For any emission price $t > t_9(\Rightarrow X_D > m_C)$, $P^D > \overline{P}$ and $P^D > P^\rho$; this implies that if a clean type charges a price above $P^D$ in order to deter dirty firm from imitating its action, it always has an incentive to imitate the dirty type’s higher price-lower quantity combination. On the other hand, if a clean type charges a price $P_C$ such that $P^D < P_C \leq \overline{P}$ then a dirty type has an incentive to imitate the clean type’s action. Therefore, a clean cannot reveal its type by charging a higher price than $P^\rho$. In particular, $P_C^opt = \min(P_C^opt, P^\rho)$ where $P^\rho$ is the minimum (downward) signaling distortion price, and $P_C^opt = P^\rho$ if

$$X_D - m_C > \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$

Note that the dirty type does not have any incentive to deviate to any price as

$$\pi(D,0,P_D^opt) > \max_p \pi(D,0,p) = \frac{(a - X_D)^2}{4}$$

Similarly, individual rationality constraint of the clean type is satisfied iff

$$\pi(C,1,P) = \max_p \pi(C,0,p) = \frac{(a - m_C)^2}{4}$$

$$(P - m_C) \left( a - \frac{P}{\rho} \right) - \frac{(a - m_C)^2}{4} > 0$$

$$\Rightarrow P^2 - P(a\rho + m_C) + \rho \frac{(a + m_C)^2}{4} < 0$$

This implies that individual rationality constraint will be satisfied for the clean type if the price charged by the clean type

$$p_C \in \left( \frac{a\rho + m_C}{2}, \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - m_C^2)}, \frac{a\rho + m_C}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - m_C^2)} \right)$$

Now, the upward distortion equilibrium price

$$P^D = \frac{a\rho + X_D}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$

of the clean type

$$\frac{a\rho + m_C}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)} = P^D < \frac{a\rho + m_C}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(a^2 - a - X_D^2)}$$
and the downward distortion equilibrium price

\[
p^l = \frac{\alpha p + X_D}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)}
\]

charged by the clean type

\[
\left(\frac{\alpha p + m_c}{2} - \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - m_c^2)}\right) < p^l < \left(\frac{\alpha p + m_c}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - m_c^2)}\right)
\]

satisfy the individual rationality constraint as \(\rho > 1\), \(m_c - X_D < \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)}\) when \(P^*_c = P^l\) (from (3)), and \(X_D - m_c > \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)}\) when \(P^*_c = P^l\) (from (4)). \(\square\)

**Proof of Proposition 3.** From Lemma 1, we know that for any \(t \leq t^k\) in the unique separating equilibrium the clean type charges a price \(P^*_c = \max(P^l_c, P^l)\). Now observe that \(P^l_c \geq P^l\) when \(t \leq t^U = t^k - \sqrt{(\rho^2 - X_D^2)}\). We also know that for any \(t \geq t^k\) the clean type charges a price \(P^*_c = \min(P^l_c, P^l)\) in the unique separating equilibrium. \(P^l_c \geq P^l \iff t \leq t^D = t^k + \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)}\). \(\square\)

**Proof of Proposition 4.** From Proposition 3, we know that for any \(t \in [t^U, t^k]\) \(P^*_c = P^l\) and

\[
\Delta_p = P^l - P^l = \frac{X_D - m_c}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)} > 0 \quad \text{from (3)}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta_p}{\partial t} = \frac{\beta}{2} - \frac{(\rho - 1)\beta X_D}{2(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)} > 0
\]

However, for any \(t \in [t^k, t^D]\) \(P^*_c = P^l\)

\[
\Delta_p = t^U - P^l = \frac{m_c - X_D}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)} > 0 \quad \text{from (4)}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta_p}{\partial t} = -\frac{\beta}{2} - \frac{(\rho - 1)\beta X_D}{2(\rho - 1)(\alpha^2 \rho - X_D^2)} < 0 \quad \square
\]

**Proof of Proposition 5.** For any emission price \(t \in [t^U, t^k]\)

\[
\Delta_{\pi} = \pi^l - \pi^l = (P^l - m_c) \left( a - \frac{P^l}{\rho} \right) \frac{(a - m_c)^2}{4\rho} < 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta_{\pi}}{\partial t} = (P^l_P - P^l) \left( -\frac{2 \rho P^l}{\rho - \rho} \right) > 0
\]

For any emission price \(t \in [t^k, t^D]\)

\[
\Delta_{\pi} = \pi^l - \pi^l = (P^D - m_c) \left( a - \frac{P^D}{\rho} \right) \frac{(a - m_c)^2}{4\rho} < 0
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \Delta_{\pi}}{\partial t} = (P^D_P - P^D) \left( -\frac{2 \rho P^D}{\rho - \rho} \right) < 0 \quad \square
\]

**Proof of Proposition 6.** For \(t \leq t^k\) since \(\pi(D, 0, P^*_D) > \pi(C, 1, P^*_C)\), a firm does not have any incentive to invest in cleaner technology. However, for any \(t \geq t^k\) \(\pi(C, 1, P^*_C) > \pi(D, 0, P^*_D)\) which implies a firm will invest in cleaner technology as long as \(f \leq \mu \pi(C, 1, P^*_C) + (1 - \mu) \pi(D, 0, P^*_D) - \pi(D, 0, P^*_D) = \mu \pi(C, 1, P^*_C) - \pi(D, 0, P^*_D)\). \(\square\)

**References**
